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THE FAILURE OF FEDERALISM: DOES COMPETITIVE
FEDERALISM ACTUALLY PROTECT INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS?
Owen Lipsett
It is axiomatic among legal scholars and jurists that, as a structural
value, federalism promotes innovation and diversity in government. 1
A broadly held corollary to this view is the concept of "competitive
federalism," whereby states compete with one another to lure citizens
and businesses. One of its advocates, Michael S. Greve, argues that
competitive federalism is omnipresent, "operat[ing] at all levels of
government and irrespective of whether citizens consume govern-
ment services as business owners, investors, workers, or for that mat-
ter as retirees or welfare recipients."' Under this hypothesis, citizens'
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1 The most frequently cited statement in support of this proposition is Justice Louis
Brandeis's statement that "a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country." New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (BrandeisJ., dissent-
ing). The Supreme Court most recently referred to Justice Brandeis's statement with ap-
proval in Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 8 (1995), stating that states "are free to serve as ex-
perimental laboratories." Many scholarly articles also reference Brandeis's statement and
its progeny. E.g., Wilson Ray Huhn, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of Sandra Day
O'Connor: A Refusal to "Foreclose the Unanticipated," 39 AKRON L. REV. 373, 412 (2006) (dis-
cussing Justice O'Connor's approval of Brandeis's statement as a description of "one of
federalism's chief virtues"); Paul E. McGreal, Alaska Equal Protection: Constitutional Law or
Common Law, 15 ALASKA L. REV. 209, 211 (1998) ("[F]ederalism preserves state and local
governments as laboratories for policy experimentation."); William H. Pryor, Jr., Madi-
son's Double Security: In Defense of Federalism, the Separation of Powers, and the Rehnquist Court,
53 ALA. L. REV. 1167, 1173-74 (2002) (identifying "laboratory of the states" as a term fa-
miliar to lawyers). But see Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism
Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593, 614-16 (1980) (arguing that, beyond several
weak examples, "a federal structure can encourage innovation by lower level governments
only if it is self-consciously exploited by politicians in the central government who can
profit by claiming credit for a successful 'innovation policy'").
2 MICHAEL S. GREVE, REAL FEDERALISM: WHY IT MATTERS, HOW IT COULD HAPPEN 3 (1999).
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ability to "vote with their feet" serves to "discipline government in the
same way in which consumer choice ... disciplines producers."'
While Greve's analysis focuses on economic liberty, it is equally
apposite to apply the concept of "competitive federalism" to personal
freedoms.4 The Rehnquist Court's increased circumscription of
Congress's role to legislate has increased the importance of this phe-
nomenon. Theoretically, "competitive federalism" should encourage
states to offer greater freedom than the minimum federal guarantees,
but this has not been the case. Rather, states have sometimes limited
individual freedoms in order to preserve perceived societal norms.
While it could be argued that states have done so as rational actors to
attract (or retain) residents, the agency problem inherent in repre-
sentative government casts some doubt on this assumption.
The federal government has always been one of enumerated pow-
ers,5 but it also enjoyed a virtually unfettered ability to enact legisla-
tion under the Commerce Clause 6 between 19377 and 1995.8 The
Rehnquist Court's shrinking of Congress's ability to enact legislation
under the Commerce Clause 9 is the most prominent example of the
3 Id.
4 See Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers". In Defense of
United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 754 (1995) ("[Flederalism is much more
important to the liberty and well being of the American people than any other structural
feature of our constitutional system.").
5 See U.S. CONST. amend. X (reserving powers not delegated to the federal government to
the states and people); id. art. I, § 8 (enumerating Congress's powers); id. art. I, § 10
(enumerating powers denied to states and therefore reserved to the federal government).
6 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting the federal government the power "[t]o regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States and with the Indian Tribes").
7 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 34-41 (1937) (authorizing the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board to exercise jurisdiction over intrastate labor relations); see
also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 129 (1942) (extending congressional power under
the Commerce Clause to situations where no economic transaction took place). The Su-
preme Court significantly relied upon this holding in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 8
(2005), in affirming enforcement of the Federal Controlled Substances Act against Cali-
fornia residents growing marijuana for personal or intrastate medical use, despite the le-
gality of such activities under California law.
8 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995) (invalidating the Gun-Free School
Zones Act as beyond the scope of the commerce power).
9 See id.; see also Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531
U.S. 159, 173-74 (2001) (invalidating administrative exercise of jurisdiction under the
Clean Water Act over ponds formed in an abandoned sand and gravel pit, in part because
allowing jurisdiction "would result in a significant impingement of the States' traditional
and primary power over land and water use"); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,
627 (2000) (invalidating the federal civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence
provided by the Violence Against Women Act as unsustainable under the Commerce
Clause).
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so-called "New Federalism.""' While limiting the ability of the federal
government to enact laws in certain areas, the Court has concomi-
tantly federalized law regarding multiple individual rights and
broadly enunciated a federal standard in such areas as the right to
die" and takings. 2  Although the Court's decision in Lawrence v.
Texas 3 may be read narrowly as an extension of the right to privacy, it
has invited federalization of the legal treatment and recognition of
same-sex couples. At the same time, in Gonzales v. Raich,14 the Court
established limits on the ability of states to protect or create individ-
ual rights when they conflicted with federal policy. This Comment
argues that as a general matter, leaving such decisions to the states, as
both the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have done, has served more
to inhibit individual liberty than to advance it.
Part I examines the structural issues latent in federalism. It will
take as its starting pointJohn 0. McGinnis and Ilya Somin's view that
10 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922-23 (1997) (holding a provision of the
Brady Act requiring state law enforcement officials to perform background checks on gun
purchasers unconstitutional on the basis that it constituted federal commandeering of
state officials); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (holding the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act unconstitutional because Congress's power to enforce the Four-
teenth Amendment does not include the power to define the content of the rights that
the Amendment protects); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996)
(holding that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, enacted under the Indian Commerce
Clause of Article I, could not abrogate the State's Eleventh Amendment sovereign immu-
nity); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 174-77 (1992) (holding that Congress
could not require states to choose between taking title to hazardous waste produced
within their borders or submitting to federal regulation of it).
11 See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 267 (2006) (holding that the Attorney General
could not use the Federal Controlled Substances Act to prosecute Oregon doctors who
prescribed lethal doses of medicine in accordance with the Oregon Death With Diginity
Act); accord Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997) (holding that Washing-
ton State's prohibition against "causing" or "aiding" a suicide did not violate the Four-
teenth Amendment). Taken together, these cases illustrate the fact that the Supreme
Court has chosen to federalize the right to die issue.
12 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489-90 (2005) (holding that economic de-
velopment is within the meaning of "public use" for Fifth Amendment purposes); see also
San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 347 (2005) (hold-
ing that full faith and credit will be given to state court determinations regarding consti-
tutional takings claims, even where claimants were required to, rather than chose to, liti-
gate in a state forum); Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 548 (2005) (holding
that parties alleging a Fifth Amendment taking must show a physical taking, a regulatory
taking, or a land-use exaction taking).
13 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (holding a statute criminalizing certain sexual conduct between
partners of the same sex unconstitutional).
14 545 U.S. 1 (2005); see supra note 7.
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"federalism is a classic example of a principal-agent problem"' 5 that
necessitates judicial review. It will briefly examine the Court's repro-
ductive rights jurisprudence from Roe v. Wade, which held that
women have a basic right to terminate their pregnancies under cer-
tain circumstances, '6 to Stenberg v. Carhart, which struck down a Ne-
braska law banning partial birth abortions,7 as a case study of how
even a constitutionally protected freedom may have disparate treat-
ment between states.
Part II of the Comment examines euthanasia as an issue that may
be said to be comfortably left to the states. As with abortion, the con-
cept of assisted suicide is abhorrent to some individuals but does not
fundamentally affect the lives, or rights, of those who are not involved
in it. There is no question of government funding or otherwise pref-
erential treatment of those who seek assistance in ending their lives.
Likewise, as with abortions, subject to the cost of travel, citizens can
theoretically move (or be moved) from one state to another to take
advantage of a regime that better suits their needs and views. Conse-
quently, the operation of states as "laboratories" in this area has not
resulted in the derogation of individual rights.
Part III of the Comment examines takings as an issue where the
Court has essentially, and dangerously, abandoned citizens to the
states in the wake of the Court's trio of decisions in 2005.18 As
McGinnis and Somin have put it: "[s]ometimes federalism can be
protected by only restricting the power of state governments, rather
than strengthening it."' 9 The unique circumstances relating to tak-
ings are just such a case. Although, after a significant popular reac-
tion, there has been a welter of legislative response to Kelo to restrain
its perceived excesses, many of the bills have provided only cosmetic
changes. Although facially this appears to be a manifestation of fed-
eralism working properly, the bills' specifics often reflect the agency
problem inherent in federalism. Additionally, the states are essen-
tially inoculated from constitutional challenges by Lingle, while the
holding of San Remo Hotel makes the issue exceedingly difficult to liti-
gate within the federal courts.
15 John 0. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, The Rehnquist Court: Federalism vs. States'Rights: A Defense
ofJudicial Review in a Federal System, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 89, 92 (2004).
16 410 U.S. 113,164 (1973).
17 530 U.S. 914, 945-46 (2000).
18 See supra note 12.
19 McGinnis & Somin, supra note 15, at 89.
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The adjudicative and ad-hoc nature of takings means that citizens
who find themselves subject to them, by definition, cannot be aware
of their circumstances in advance of the taking. This means that the
competitive justification for federalism does not apply, and the
agency problem is further exacerbated. States and politicians, unlike
citizens, are likely to be intimately aware of the provisions involved-
as is evident from the numerous exceptions contained within legisla-
tion passed since Kelo that simply rename, rather than change, exist-
ing policies. The Court's recent takings jurisprudence thus appears
to have abandoned citizens to the states and denied them necessary
recourse with respect to challenging takings in federal court.
Part IV of the Comment prospectively examines the issue of rec-
ognition of same-sex relationships. In Lawrence, the Court noted that
"[t]he present case .... does not involve whether the government
must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual
persons seek to enter., 20 However, since Massachusetts recognizes
same-sex marriages, and several other states have recognized civil un-
ions between two members of the same sex, the issue will clearly arise.
Unlike civil union statutes, which may be understood simply as the
granting of additional rights by states to citizens within their borders,
Massachusetts's statute creates a legal relationship that either must be
recognized by other states under the United States Constitution's Full
Faith and Credit Clause"' or be invalid under the Defense of Marriage
Act." Since marriage is an ongoing relationship, as opposed to a sin-
gle event such as euthanasia or the taking of property, the Court will
likely be required to eventually reach the issue of recognition of
same-sex relationships that it avoided in Lawrence.
Part V of the Comment concludes that competitive federalism
should properly be understood as a limited doctrine with respect to
individual rights. A federal regime may be appropriate for single
events, such as euthanasia or reproductive rights, that occur within a
state's borders (and for which a citizen may easily leave the state in
search of a more favorable regime). A state-driven regime without
federal oversight is less appropriate for takings because of the inher-
ent agency problem. Finally, it is simply impracticable for an ongoing
relationship to be cognizable under one state's law, but not an-
20 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
21 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public
Acts, Records and judicial Proceedings of every other State.").
22 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000) (allowing states to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages per-
formed in other states).
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other's. Consequently, with respect to individual rights, federalism
should be best understood as a broad value subject to specific case-by-
case application rather than as a catch-all shield for citizens or a
sword for state governments.
I. THE STRUCTURE OF FEDERALISM AND THE ROLE OF STATES AS
AGENTS
The United States Supreme Court has identified the primary role
of the federal system as the vindication of individual rights. Specifi-
cally, in New York v. United States, it identified the "fundamental pur-
pose served by our Government's federal structure, 2' as follows:
The Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States for the bene-
fit of the States or state governments as abstract political entities, or even
for the benefit of the public officials governing the States. To the con-
trary, the Constitution divides authority between federal and state governments for
the protection of individuals. State sovereignty is not just an end in itself:
"Rather, federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the
diffusion of sovereign power." 'Just as the separation and independence
of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent
the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy bal-
ance of power between the States and the Federal Government will re-
duce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front."
24
The Court further noted that the plaintiff State's legislators had actu-
ally testified in favor of the federal law (which required them to adopt
certain policies with respect to hazardous waste disposal) and then
later challenged it with the apparent hope of being able to blame the
25federal government for this unpopular program.
McGinnis and Somin have generalized this statement into what I
will refer to as an agency conception of the role of state and federal
officials:
In our federal system, the people, to use economic terminology, are
"principals" and state and federal officials merely their "agents." This al-
location of roles creates the possibility that principal-agent problems will
arise in the maintenance of federalism when the interests of elected offi-
cials diverge from those of ordinary citizens. The structure of federalism
thus must be protected against the machinations of both federal and
state officials. Often, the interests of the latter conflict with this structure
no less than those of the former.' 6
23 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992).
24 Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
25 Id. at 181-83.
26 McGinnis & Somin, supra note 15, at 89 (footnote omitted).
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The authors further note that the agency problems inherent in such
an arrangement are exacerbated by the presence of multiple princi-
pals, in the form of the heterogeneous electorate, which they liken to
the general failure by dispersed shareholders to monitor corporate
managers.27 Analogizing voters to shareholders, while useful in iden-
tifying the agency problem inherent in government, ignores the fact
that voters' interests may conflict regarding equity in the corporation
in which they hold stock.
As I will discuss, what one person regards as the right to terminate
her pregnancy may be regarded by others as state-sanctioned murder.
Both advocates 28 and opponents2 of a woman's right to an abortion
can make colorable claims that their position is the one that vindi-
cates individual liberty. Although it likewise does not directly affect
other individuals, the issue of euthanasia is similarly fraught with con-
flict. The recognition of same-sex relationships, which provides the
partners with potentially valuable rights, and the government's emi-
nent domain power also directly affect only the individuals in ques-
tion, but nonetheless are of interest to others. Fellow citizens may ob-
ject to same-sex relationships, or they may regard publicly beneficial
development as a justification for the compensated taking of private
land.
In these situations, voters, to varying degrees, more closely resem-
ble competing claimants to valuable goods than shareholders with
identical interests in having the value of their shares maximized.
Consequently, the federal system serves not only to guarantee liberty,
but also to adjudicate what constitutes liberty. Competitive federal-
ism can also be regarded as a rough method of accounting for the
heterogeneous concepts of what constitutes liberty held by the citi-
zens and by the governments of different states as their agents.
Thus, while the federal system is intended to vindicate individual
rights, the presence of the agency problem discussed above demon-
strates a need for monitoring and enforcement. After examining the
relative impotence of political safeguards in dealing with this prob-
lem, McGinnis and Somin conclude that the federal judiciary may be
27 Id. at 98.
28 See, e.g., NARAL Pro-Choice America, Abortion, http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/
issues/abortion/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2008) ( "In 1973, the Supreme Court guaranteed
American women the right to choose abortion....").
29 See, e.g., Republican National Coalition for Life, http://www.rnclife.org (last visited Feb.
3, 2008) ("The Republican Party was founded on the principle that no human being
should be considered the property of another.").
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the best guardian of federalism.30 The judiciary itself has no clear in-
terest in undermining the present distribution of powers, and it is the
institution that is most likely to enforce neutral principles."
The case study of abortion rights generally supports McGinnis and
Somin's portrayal of the judiciary as a better guardian of individual
rights, while still allowing states some latitude in making choices on
behalf of their principals, the voters. After the Supreme Court first
32
located an inherent "right to privacy" within marriage, which it ex-
tended to all relationships based on a theory of individual rights, 33 it
held in Roe v. Wade "that the right of personal privacy includes the
abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified and must be
considered against important state interests in regulation.3 4  The
Wade Court laid out a prescriptive trimester framework establishing
when and to what extent states could restrict or even ban abortions. 5
Over the following two decades, the Court clarified the nature of
what constitutes valid "state interests in regulation." It struck down
requirements for spousal 36 and parental notice and consent (the lat-
ter absent a judicial bypass procedure for minors to be deemed ma-
ture enough to make an independent decision) 37 on the one hand,
30 McGinnis & Somin, supra note 15, at 104-05.
31 Id. at 128-30.
32 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (invalidating a state law barring the use
of contraceptives on the basis that it impermissibly interfered with "a relationship lying
within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees").
33 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If the right of privacy means anything, it is
the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to
bear or beget a child.").
34 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
35 Id. at 164-65 ("(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the
abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the preg-
nant woman's attending physician. (b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the
end of the first trimester, the State, in promoting its interest in the health of the mother,
may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to
maternal health. (c) For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its in-
terest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe,
abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preserva-
tion of the life or health of the mother.").
36 Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976) ("[S]ince the State
cannot regulate or proscribe abortion during the first stage, when the physician and his
patient make that decision, the State cannot delegate authority to any particular person,
even the spouse, to prevent abortion during that same period.").
37 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647-50 (1979) (plurality opinion) ("[A statute] cannot
constitutionally permit judicial disregard of the abortion decision of a minor who has
been determined to be mature and fully competent to assess the implications of the
choice she has made.").
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but held that states could disfavor the practice of abortion through
budget decisions because Wade "implies no limitation on the author-
ity of a State to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abor-
tion, and to implement that judgment by the allocation of public
funds."3 8 In rejecting a subsequent constitutional challenge to a bar
on federal funding for even medically necessary abortions, except in
cases of rape, incest, or where the mother's life was at risk, the Court
explained that:
[R]egardless of whether the freedom of a woman to choose to terminate her
pregnancy for health reasons lies at the core or the periphery of the due
process liberty recognized in Wade, it simply does not follow that a woman's
freedom of choice carries with it a constitutional entitlement to the financial
resources to avail herself of the full range of protected choices.
39
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,4° the
Court largely restated its prior doctrine on abortion. While affirming
Wade under stare decisis,4 it discarded that decision's trimester frame-
work on the basis that it was "not... part of the essential holding of
Roe., 42  Perhaps most crucially, while it acknowledged the right of
states to interpret a woman's right to have an abortion within certain
parameters, it stressed the importance of a neutral and consistent
baseline for such rights.
43
Despite this, however, states have sought to impose restrictions
well beyond those allowed. For example, the Court invalidated a Ne-
braska ban on partial-birth abortions, while South Dakota enacted a
law "to reinstate the prohibition against certain acts causing the ter-
mination of an unborn human life,' which by its terms contradicts
both Wade and Casey.46 Voters subsequently rejected this change by
38 Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977).
39 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980).
40 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
41 Id. at 846.
42 Id. at 873 (plurality opinion).
43 Id. at 844 (majority opinion) ("Liberty finds no refuge in ajurisprudence of doubt.").
44 Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 945-46 (2000).
45 2006 S.D. SESS. LAws Ch. 119.
46 Id. at § 1 ("[L]ife begins at the time of conception, a conclusion confirmed by scientific
advances since the 1973 decision of Roe v. Wade."); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Ca-
sey, 505 U.S. 833, 869-70 ("We conclude that the basic decision in Roe was based on a
constitutional analysis which we cannot now repudiate. The woman's liberty is not so
unlimited, however, that from the outset the State cannot show its concern for the life of
the unborn, and at a later point in fetal development the State's interest in life has suffi-
cient force so that the right of the woman to terminate the pregnancy can be re-
stricted.... We conclude that the line should be drawn at viability.... .").
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referendum 7 Stenberg not only illustrates the crucial role the Court
plays in vindicating individual rights against encroachment by the
states, but also the tendency of state legislatures to seek to impose di-
vergent laws, presumptively on the basis of the preferences of their
citizens.
The United States Congress subsequently prohibited partial birth
abortions (except where the mother's life is at risk) in 2003,48 which
the Court held constitutional in Gonzales v. Carhart.49 However, like
Wade, which the Gonzales court cites as settled law,50 by enunciating a
broad federal standard with respect to one aspect of reproductive
rights, the decision may lead to further controversy over others.5'
II. AN ISSUE COMFORTABLY LEFT TO THE STATES: EUTHANASIA
The Court has explicitly recognized the right of states to disagree
on the subject of euthanasia. It held that a Washington State law that
criminalized assisting in a suicide did not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment.5 2 The Court also held that the Controlled Substances
Act 3 does not authorize the United States Attorney General to pre-
vent Oregon doctors from dispensing controlled substances for as-
sisted suicide, which Oregon law empowers doctors to do.
As with Wade, it is useful to consider the development of the Su-
preme Court's doctrine regarding the so-called "right to die." In Cru-
zan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, the Court affirmed the
Supreme Court of Missouri's denial of the plaintiffs' petition to re-
55
move their daughter's feeding tube, who was in a vegetative state.
The Court based its determination on the fact that the daughter had
not adequately made her wishes known to her parents under Missouri
law.56 In doing so, the Court declined to enunciate a general rule,
47 See, e.g., Kirk Johnson, New State Push to Restrict Abortions May Follow, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20,
2007, at A18 ("The [South Dakota] Legislature passed a sweeping ban, only to see the
public repeal it in a statewide referendum.").
48 Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub.L. 108-105, 117 Stat. 1206 (2003) codified at
18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006)).
49 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
50 Id. at 1626.
51 SeeJohnson, supra note 47 (discussing the likelihood that the decision will encourage ac-
tivists on both sides of the reproductive fights debate to push for legislation to be en-
acted).
52 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997).
53 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (2000).
54 Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 267 (2006).
55 497 U.S. 261, 285 (1990).
56 Id.
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confining its holding to the circumstances of the case. It therefore
analyzed whether Missouri's limit on when a surrogate could refuse
life-saving hydration and nutrition on behalf of an incompetent per-
son violated due process and held that it did not.
57
The Cruzan Court avoided the question of whether a right to die
existed under the Constitution, and instead found that, as with abor-
tion, a state could potentially have interests in regulating such situa-
tions:
Whether or not Missouri's clear and convincing evidence requirement
comports with the United States Constitution depends in part on what
interests the State may properly seek to protect in this situation. Missouri
relies on its interest in the protection and preservation of human life,
and there can be no gainsaying this interest. As a general matter, the
States-indeed, all civilized nations-demonstrate their commitment to
life by treating homicide as a serious crime. Moreover, the majority of
States in this country have laws imposing criminal penalties on one who
assists another to commit suicide.... But in the context presented here,
a State has more particular interests at stake. The choice between life
and death is a deeply personal decision of obvious and overwhelming fi-
nality. We believe Missouri may legitimately seek to safeguard the per-
sonal element of this choice through the imposition of heightened evi-
dentiary requirements. It cannot be disputed that the Due Process
Clause protects an interest in life as well as an interest in refusing life-
sustaining medical treatment.... A State is entitled to guard against po-
tential abuses in such situations.58
Thus, while the Court unequivocally supported Missouri's law, it nev-
ertheless refused to find that the Due Process Clause compelled such
safeguards, relying instead on the more amorphous grounds of "civi-
lized" norms.
In Glucksberg, the Court held that Washington's ban on physician-
assisted suicide likewise did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantee of due process on similarly broad but non-constitutional
grounds. The Court uncritically noted that while Washington had
enacted a prohibition on "mercy killing," Oregon had "legalized phy-
sician-assisted suicide for competent, terminally ill adults" and the
Federal Assisted Suicide Funding Restoration Act of 1997 had barred
the use of federal funds for physician-assisted suicide.59  This
amounted to a tacit acknowledgement that the issue was one for
states to decide individually. The Glucksberg Court declined to locate
a liberty right to euthanasia in the face of "a consistent and almost
57 Id. at 281-82.
58 Id. at 280-81.
59 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 717-18 (1997).
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universal tradition that has long rejected the asserted right, and con-
tinues explicitly to reject it today, even for terminally ill, mentally
competent adults.
60
Despite the apparently "almost universal tradition" of prohibiting
suicide that the Court referenced, it stated only that prohibitions
against assisting in suicide were justified, but not required. 6' The
Court noted instead that "[t]hroughout the Nation, Americans are
engaged in an earnest and profound debate about the morality, legal-
ity, and practicality of physician-assisted suicide. Our holding permits
this debate to continue, as it should in a democratic society. 62 In the
companion case, Vacco v. Quill, the Court unanimously held that New
York's decisionting, which permitted patients to refuse life-saving
medical treatment but at the same time ingprohibited assisted sui-
cide, did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause.63
The Court's implied willingness to countenance diversity in states'
euthanasia regimes in Glucksberg makes its decision to uphold Ore-
gon's authorization of the practice in Gonzales v. Oregon somewhat
understandable. What makes the case striking, however, is its proce-
dural posture. While the decision, like the result in Glucksberg, af-
firmed a state's right to make such decision, the context was entirely
different. At issue in Oregon was the validity of the Attorney General's
claim that the prescription of lethal drugs under Oregon's Death
with Dignity Act,64 providing for euthanasia, violated a federal inter-
pretive rule promulgated under regulations pursuant to the Federal
Controlled Substances Act.65 The relevant regulation required that
for "[a] prescription for a controlled substance to be effective it must
be issued for a legitimate medical purpose by an individual practitio-
,,66ner acting in the usual course of his professional practice.
The Court rejected the Attorney General's claim that the Regula-
tion empowered him to disrupt the supply of drugs to Oregon doc-
tors for the purpose of euthanasia:
The Attorney General has rulemaking power to fulfill his duties under
the CSA. The specific respects in which he is authorized to make rules,
60 Id. at 723.
61 Id. at 735 n.24 (explaining that the opinion "does not absolutely foreclose" claims to be
able to end one's life with a physician's assistance).
62 Id. at 735.
63 521 U.S. 793, 797 (1997).
64 OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-.897 (2005).
65 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (2000).
66 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2007).
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however, instruct us that he is not authorized to make a rule declaring il-
legitimate a medical standard for care and treatment of patients that is
67specifically authorized under state law.
The Court thus implicitly found the standard for care (that is, for
euthanasia) valid under federal law. As Justice Scalia made evident in
his dissent, the Court's "decision... [was] perhaps driven by a feel-
ing that the subject of assisted suicide is none of the Federal Gov-
ernment's business."
The question thus arises as to whether this is a case in which "the
Constitution divides authority between federal and state governments
for the protection of individuals. '" 69 I believe that it is. One of the
major arguments advanced in favor of competitive federalism is that
it enables citizens to act as consumers of government by choosing the
regime that best suits their needs and views.7 ° A circumstance where
two adjacent states have differing regimes with respect to allowing or
prohibiting euthanasia seems to illustrate perfectly the multiplicity of
perspectives enabled by competitive federalism.
Euthanasia, however, is a relatively facile case. As with reproduc-
tive rights, only the individual exercising the right in question is di-
rectly affected. Likewise, an individual can only die or have an abor-
tion in a single state. It should be noted that even here the federal
courts, especially the Supreme Court, still have an important role to
play in ensuring states do not engage in a race to the bottom in dero-
gation of constitutional guarantees. More difficult cases arise when
conflicting claims exist. The issue of takings represents a clear con-
flict between the needs and rights of individuals and society as a
whole. The recognition of same-sex unions in some states but not in
others raises the question of whether competitive federalism can ex-
tend to contradictory regimes within states continuing relationships
are at issue.
III. AN ISSUE UNCOMFORTABLY LEFT TO THE STATES: TAKINGS
In Kelo v. City of New London, the Supreme Court held that a taking
of private property to facilitate economic development by a private
67 Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 258 (2006).
68 Id. at 298 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
69 NewYork v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992).
70 See GREVE, supra note 2, at 2-3 (arguing that "citizen choice among competing jurisdic-
tions" is the hallmark of "real" federalism).
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actor was valid under the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause. v' It
characterized its decision in terms of federalist concerns:
Viewed as a whole, our jurisprudence has recognized that the needs of
society have varied between different parts of the Nation, just as they
have evolved over time in response to changed circumstances. Our earli-
est cases in particular embodied a strong theme of federalism, emphasiz-
ing the "great respect" that we owe to state legislatures and state courts in
discerning local public needs. For more than a century, our public use
jurisprudence has wisely eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny
in favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in determining what pub-
72lic needs justify the use of the takings power.
This holding seems relatively intuitive when takings are, as in Kelo,
regarded as responses to local circumstances. Since Kelo was decided,
thirty-four states have enacted or amended laws restricting takings,
and the decision continues to inspire calls to do the same elsewhere.73
Facially, this appears to be competitive federalism at work, with state-
agents responding to pressure from citizen-principals to provide ad-
ditional guarantees that their property rights are protected.74
There are, however, significant differences between takings and
the right to die. First, the fact-specific nature of takings means that
they are relatively unpredictable. Second, because takings involve
real property, rather than personal physical liberty, while citizens
could move to a state with a regime that better suits their prefer-
ences, 5 they would still be obliged to pursue their claim under the
regime of the state in which the property in question was located.
Laws governing abortion, euthanasia, and (as will be discussed in
the next Part) same-sex unions establish bright-line rules for general
application rather than standards. They establish whether a woman
71 545 U.S. 469, 484 (2005).
72 Id. at 482-83 (citation and footnote omitted).
73 See, e.g., Kevin Wingert, State's Eminent Domain Law Questioned, Wvo. TRIBUNE-EAGLE, Jan.
10, 2007, at A1O (discussing public pressure for revision of Wyoming's eminent domain
laws).
74 It should be noted that laws limiting eminent domain contain exceptions that signifi-
cantly limit their applicability, thereby making them little different from their pre-Kelo
counterparts. See, e.g., 26 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 204 (2006) (allowing the use of eminent
domain for private enterpise in a variety of circumstances, including blight, despite its ti-
de, "Eminent domain for private business prohibited"). For a survey of eminent domain
laws since Kelo, see Timothy Sandefur, The "Backlash" So Far: Will Americans Get Meaningful
Eminent Domain Reform?, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REv. 709. Sandefur concludes that "[s]o far,
the backlash [against Kelo] has produced mixed results." Id. at 712.
75 See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 504 (1999) (affirming that states must treat all their
citizens equally regardless of their length of residency); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S.
745, 757-59 (1966) (recognizing and reaffirming a constitutional right of citizens to
travel between the states).
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may have an abortion, whether a doctor may prescribe lethal drugs,
and what (if any) legal recognition same-sex partnerships may be ac-
corded. Certainly, there may be disagreements as to the facts of the
case, but each of these laws either permits or prohibits the behavior
in question in certain situations. As a result, to the extent their per-
sonal circumstances allow, citizens can choose the regime that best
suits their preferences and needs. By contrast, because state laws re-
lating to eminent domain only establish standards, and because tak-
ings occur on a case-by-case basis, their application is significantly less
predictable.
Even if the circumstances in which a state (or, more likely, a mu-
nicipality) would apply eminent domain were predictable, the fixed
nature of real property would create a uniquely problematic situa-
tion. While citizens may freely move between states, they cannot
move their real property. Their only recourse would be to sell it, the
very choice that takings compel. The acts of marriage formation and
abortion are essentially the same in different states, while real prop-
erty is by definition both unique and immobile. Even if citizens knew
precisely whether and when their property would be subject to a tak-
ing, they would not be presented with a choice between holding the
same property in different states, but rather would have to choose
whether they could hold it at all. Considering the fact that eminent
domain is by its nature unpredictable, this argument is purely aca-
demic.
The Court did not decide Kelo in isolation. In the same Term it
decided two other takings cases that, taken together, made the issue
squarely a matter for the states.76 In Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., the
Court unanimously reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision that a Ha-
waii statute limiting the rent that oil companies could charge dealers
who leased their service stations constituted an uncompensated tak-
ing. 7 In doing so, the Court explained that plaintiffs could only chal-
lenge government regulations as uncompensated takings of private
property by alleging a physical taking, a total regulatory taking, or a
land-use exaction sufficiently onerous as to be deemed a per se physi-
781cal taking. In San Remo Hotel,79 the Court affirmed the Ninth Cir-
76 See William A. Fletcher, Kelo, Lingle, and San Remo Hotel: Takings Law Now Belongs to the
States, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 767, 776-78 (2006) (arguing that this trio of land-use cases
entirely relegated eminent domain decisions to the states).
77 544 U.S. 528, 548 (2005).
78 Id.
79 San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 347 (2005).
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cuit's holding that federal courts could not create an exception to the
full faith and credit statute8 to provide a federal forum for plaintiffs
to relitigate federal takings claims that were required to be brought
in a state forum in the first instance in order to ripen. "Taken to-
gether, these three decisions represent a substantial change-entirely
in the direction of relegating takings issues to the political and legal
judgments of the states.""2
Notwithstanding the notoriety of Kelo, San Remo Hotel is the most
significant of the three cases. Kelo and Lingle serve to define what
constitutes an actionable taking, but San Remo Hotel narrows the re-
course available to plaintiffs for challenging such takings. " [T] he
combination of Williamson County (in its current form) and § 1738 ef-
fectively relegates all litigation regarding federal takings challenges to
state and local land use regulations to the state courts." 3 As a result,
the only federal input into such decisions will be grants of certiorari
by the United States Supreme Court, "but an occasional policy-setting
decision by the Supreme Court is far different from retail, case-by-
case litigation in federal district court. ''s4 As one commentator put it:
Williamson County v. Hamilton Bank was a mistake from the start. Although
that decision said 'go to state court first, but if you lose, you are welcome in
federal courts,' it did not explain how that rule interacted with a federal pre-
clusion doctrine that said 'if you've been in state court, you must stay
there. 85
There are two inherent problems with this state of affairs. First,
state courts seeking to apply federal takings law in such cases will do
so without the circuit in which they are located overseeing them and
establishing its own takings jurisprudence. As San Remo Hotel illus-
trates, misapplying doctrines that were intended to cover an entirely
86different subject can be problematic. Second, and more impor-
tantly, takings is an area in which the inherent agency problem dis-
80 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006).
81 The Court's holding in Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473
U.S. 172, 186 (1985), mandates this result.
82 Fletcher, supra note 76, at 776.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 J. David Breemer, You Can Check Out But You Can Never Leave: The Story of San Remo Ho-
tel-The Supreme Court Relegates Federal Takings Claims to State Courts Under a Rule Intended to
Ripen the Claims for Federal Review, 33 B.C. ENVrL. ArE. L. REv. 247, 305 (2006).
86 Strikingly, the Supreme Court took issue with this very phenomenon in Lingle, explaining
that the "substantially advances" test applied by the Ninth Circuit was intended to relate
to due process rather than takings inquiries. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528,
542-44 (2005).
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cussed above is particularly strong. Government actors have a signifi-
cant informational advantage and have a strong self-interest in
achieving outcomes that reallocate scarce resources away from the
current property holders to others whom they favor for political or
economic reasons. Consequently, this seems like the sort of situation,
where, in the words of McGinnis and Somin, "federalism can be pro-
tected by only restricting the power of state governments, rather than
strengthening it.""7
IV. AN INTERMEDIATE ISSUE: SAME-SEX MARRIAGE""
In Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court stated that "[t] he present
case ... does not involve whether the government must give formal
recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to en-
ter."89 As such, the decision did not disturb the federal Defense of
Marriage Act of 1996 (DOMA).90 As enacted, DOMA established that,
for the purpose of the federal government, "the word 'marriage'
means only a legal union between one man and one woman as hus-
band and wife." 91 It further provides that states are not "required to
give effect to any public act.., of any other State ... respecting a re-
lationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a mar-
riage under the laws of such other State ... or claim arising from
such relationship."' The Act thus not only denies same-sex marriages
federal recognition but also denies such marriages recognition by
other states under the Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause.93
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, recognizing that
the Lawrence Court had declined to assess whether same-sex mar-
riages would have to be granted as a matter of federal law,94 held
(among other things) that, in view of the significant economic9 5 and
social96 benefits of marriage, its denial to same-sex couples "violates
87 McGinnis & Somin, supra note 15, at 89.
88 This Part will not examine same-sex civil unions, except insofar as courts have required
some form of recognition for same-sex couples. The reason for this is that these unions
constitute an additional right for a state's citizens, valid only within the state's boundaries,
while legally contracted marriages have traditionally been recognized everywhere.
89 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
90 Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 2, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1738C (2000)).
91 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
92 28 U.S.C. § 1738C.
93 See supra note 21.
94 Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941,948 (Mass. 2003).
95 Id. at 955-58.
96 Id. at 955.
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the basic premises of individual liberty and equality under law pro-
tected by the Massachusetts Constitution.
97
At present, Massachusetts is the only state to recognize same-sex
marriage, while four states (and the District of Columbia) have no
explicit prohibition against the practice."" Nineteen states have stat-
utes that define marriage as only between opposite-sex partners. The
remaining twenty-six states have constitutional provisions prohibiting
the contracting or recognition of same-sex marriages."
Same-sex marriages contracted in Massachusetts are thus unlikely
to be recognized anywhere else besides New York. It is entirely possi-
ble, however, that other states may recognize non-marital rights of
same-sex couples. Both Vermont °° and New Jersey's' °' highest courts
have found that as a matter of equal protection, same-sex couples are
entitled to similar benefits as those that opposite-sex married couples
enjoy, leading those states to adopt statutes providing for civil unions
for same-sex couples.112 In Alaska Civil Liberties Union v. Alaska, the
Supreme Court of Alaska held that even though Alaska's Constitution
restricts marriage to opposite-sex couples, the State's policy of limit-
ing benefits to the spouses (as opposed to same-sex partners) of em-
ployees violated the equal protection clause of the Alaska Constitu-
tion. 103 There the Alaska Civil Liberties court reasoned that in the wake
of Lawrence's holding that homosexuality could not be criminalized,1
0 4
same-sex couples could not be deprived of benefits simply on the ba-
sis that they could not be married. 15
97 Id. at 968.
98 An intermediate appellate court in New York, one of the four states in question, recently
held that a marriage contracted between two women in Ontario, Canada, was valid in that
state. Martinez v. County of Monroe, 1562 CA 06-02591, 2008 WL 275138, at *2 (N.Y.
App. Div. Feb. 1, 2008).
99 See Human Rights Campaign, Statewide Marriage Prohibitions, http://www.hrc.org/
documents/marriage-prohibit_20070919.pdf (last visited February 11, 2008).
100 Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999) (holding that excluding same-sex couples
from the benefits of marriage could not be reconciled with the values in Vermont's Con-
stitution).
101 Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 224 (NJ. 2006) (holding that the equal protection clause of
the NewJersey Constitution requires the NewJersey legislature to either amend the Con-
stitution to allow same-sex couples to marry or to create a "parallel statutory structure,"
such as a civil union statute).
102 See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 37:1-28 to -36 (West 2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201-1207
(2002).
103 122 P.3d 781, 795 (Alaska 2005) (holding that the spousal limitations of benefits provided
to public employees violated the equal protection clause in Alaska's Constitution).
104 See supra note 13.
105 122 P.3d at 793.
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Considering the novelty of this issue, any prediction of what the
United States Supreme Court would decide is purely speculative, par-
ticularly because the states themselves are in the process of working
out whether, and how, to recognize relationships that are only con-
tractable elsewhere.1 6 One critic has noted that courts have tended
to side-step equal protection-based challenges (as well as Lawrence's
implication that policies discriminating on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion are subject to something greater than a rational basis standard of
review) because public opinion tends to oppose same-sex unions.10
7
On the other hand, federal law, such as the Uniform Parentage Act,
and general choice of law principles may serve to guarantee rights
such as parental rights for a non-biological parent of a child of a
same-sex relationship. 108
The disparities between these approaches illustrate the extent to
which this issue is in flux. Legal institutions and precedents based on
the presence of marriage in its traditional form are not necessarily
adaptable to legal regimes that establish a continuum of non-marital
relationships or where the recognition of such relationships varies
with geography. Like euthanasia and abortion, marriage occurs in a
single location, but unlike euthanasia and abortion, marriage is ongo-
ing. The analogy to real property for same-sex marriage is compel-
ling insofar as both are associated (at least for the moment in the
case of same-sex marriage) with a single location. But because a mar-
riage is theoretically as mobile as its constituent parties, this analogy
breaks down as well.
Returning to the question of whether federalism serves to protect
individual rights, it appears that with respect to same-sex marriage,
the division of authority between federal and state governments does
not serve to protect individuals. Rather, same-sex married couples
106 See William C. Duncan, Survey of Interstate Recognition of Quasi-Marital Statuses, 3 AVE MARIA
L. REv. 617, 635 (2005) ("It is particularly difficult when some states outpace others in ac-
cepting novel arrangements. At these times conflict between the laws of different juris-
dictions is inevitable.").
107 C. Brett Miller, Comment, Same Sex Marriage: An Examination of the Issues of Due Process and
Equal Protection, 59 ARK. L. REV. 471, 509 (2006) ("If one considers past cases, there are
currently many protected rights and groups of people that would never have achieved
such status if past courts had interpreted the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses in
as limited a way as some courts are doing now with respect to same-sex marriage.").
108 See Deborah L. Forman, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Parents in the Wake of Gay Marriage,
Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships, 46 B.C. L. REv. 1, 26-65 (2004) (arguing that exist-
ing federal statutes and case law may secure certain parental rights for the non-biological
parents of the child of a same-sex partnership, even in states that have enacted a Defense
of Marriage Act).
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find that, under the Federal Defense of Marriage Act, their marriages
cease to be recognized as such as soon as they move from Massachu-
setts1°9 unless they are moving to New York." On the other hand, as
Alaska Civil Liberties Union indicates, they may still have access to cer-
tain benefits, although by dint of their commitment to one another,
rather than because of their marriage."' This situation is further ex-
acerbated by the fact that it seems difficult to discern a broad trend
either toward greater recognition of same-sex marriage or away from
it-the movements toward each outcome seem in large part to be in-
spired by the movements toward the other. At present Vermont,
11
2
Connecticut,"3 New Jersey," 4 Oregon, 5 and New Hampshire 6 have
adopted civil unions, which essentially provide same-sex couples with
the rights a state can confer on married couples. Washington,"7 Cali-
fornia,18 and Maine"9 currently recognize same-sex domestic partner-
ships, which provide more limited rights. Hawaii allows same-sex
partners to designate one another as "reciprocal beneficiaries," pri-
marily for purposes of insurance and decisionmaking. 20
V. CONCLUSION
It is thus by no means self-evident that the Supreme Court's juris-
prudence is entirely consistent with its statement that "the Constitu-
tion divides authority between federal and state governments for the
protection of individuals." 2 ' This lack of clarity reflects the fact that
the protection of individuals and federalism are not always consistent
values. By providing states the opportunity to adopt different re-
gimes, the Supreme Court has created a situation in which states can
109 See supra text accompanying notes 92-93.
110 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
111 See 122 P.3d 781, 793-94 (Alaska 2005) (opining that, although it may be reasonable for
the State to distinguish between heterosexual employees for the purpose of providing
benefits based on marital status, it is unreasonable for the State to distinguish between
heterosexual and homosexual employees on the same basis when it is not possible for
homosexual employees to marry).
112 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201-1207 (2002).
113 CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46b-38aa to -38pp (2006).
114 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 37:1-28 to -36 (West 2007).
115 Oregon Family Fairness Act, 99 Or. Laws 2007 (2007).
116 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457-A:1 (2008).
117 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.60.010 to .070 (West 2008).
118 CAL. FAIM. CODE § 297 (West 2007).
119 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2710 (2007).
120 HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. § 572C-3 (LexisNexis 2007).
121 NewYork v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992).
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offer differing (as is inherent in federalism) but not necessarily com-
peting regimes. The economic arguments used to support competi-
tive federalism do not relate to individual rights, and, as a result,
states lack an incentive to innovate.
Among individual liberties, the arguments justifying leaving the
right to die to individual states are closest to those underlying eco-
nomic competitive federalism. Assisted suicide by definition takes
place only once and only in one place, and the citizen of a state that
prohibits it is free to move to another which allows it. States making
the choice to allow (or prevent) people from engaging in behavior
not within the purview of federal law are the perfect embodiment of
Justice Brandeis's famous suggestion that states can operate as labora-
tories for national governmental policy.122 In cases such as these, the
Supreme Court seeks only to answer the threshold question of
whether state laws comport with the Federal Constitution. As Justice
Rehnquist stated in his opinion in Casey: "Our task is, as always, to
decide only whether the challenged provisions of a law comport with
the United States Constitution. If, as we believe, these do, their wis-
dom as a matter of public policy is for the people of [the state] to de-
cide.' 23 Although some scholars believe even this constitutes exces-
sive federal intrusion, 124 this statement may be understood as an
orthodox endorsement of federalism with respect to individual rights.
As the example of takings illustrates, leaving matters to the states
does not necessarily ensure the protection of individual liberty.
Taken in isolation, Kelo could be understood as being analogous to
Casey; both establish the rough borders of a substantive right granted
by the United States Constitution and the extent to which states may
vary it. However, taken together with Lingle and San Remo Hotel,
which were decided during the same Term, Kelo becomes an invita-
tion for states to behave essentially as they please with respect to tak-
ings with only the comparatively weak threat of the Supreme Court
122 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see
supra note 1.
123 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 979 (1992) (Rehnquist, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
124 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Federalism Decisions of Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor: Is
Halfa Loaf Enough?, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1793, 1794 (2006) ("I take the view that on many
key questions of federalism [the Justices] should have pushed harder and moved farther
than they ultimately did."); John Tuskey, Do as We Say and Not (Necessarily) as We Do: The
Constitution, Federalism, and the Supreme Court's Exercise of Judicial Power, 34 CAP. U. L. REV.
153, 157-58 (2005) (arguing that even after the advent of the New Federalism, the Su-
preme Court has "remained committed to judicially-created doctrines that allow the
Court to order states around in the supposed name of the Constitution").
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granting certiorari to keep them in check. This problem is particu-
larly acute because citizens cannot ascertain in advance the likelihood
that they will be subjected to a taking, thus giving states an incentive,
if anything, to engage in a race to the bottom in this area to attract
businesses (although even this would require some clever maneuver-
ing).
The disparate responses of states to the issue of recognizing same-
sex marriages suggests that one state's "novel social and economic
experiments"' 125 may indeed create risks for the rest of the country. A
same-sex couple married in Massachusetts sthat seekseeking to settle
elsewhere would, by definition, extend that state's "experiment."
With the Federal Defense of Marriage Act specifying that marriages
may only be contracted between opposite-sex partners for purposes
of federal law16 and many state constitutions defining marriage in
similar terms,'27 a state that does not recognize same-sex marriages
would seek to claim that the Massachusetts law creates a right cogni-
zable only in that state"" and New York. 129 Far from protecting the
couple in question, this would in effect force them to choose between
their marriage and their constitutionally guaranteed right to travel.
As this example demonstrates, federalism does not necessarily serve
to "protect" individuals.
The concept of states operating as laboratories in competition
with one another makes significantly more sense with respect to eco-
nomics than individual liberties. In cases in which citizens realisti-
cally can go to a state that offers their preferred policy, such as as-
sisted suicide, the arguments in favor of federalism hold. These
arguments fail in the case of takings, where state policy is unpredict-
able and a direct comparison between states is impossible. The dis-
parity of state recognition of same-sex marriage, forcing same-sex
couples to choose between the rights they enjoy as a unit and their
right to travel, further illustrates the inapplicability of federalism to
issues of individual rights. Thus, federalism does not necessarily serve
to protect individual rights, making increased federal judicial over-
sight of state governments in these areas particularly desirable.
125 New State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
126 See supra Part IV.
127 See Human Rights Campaign, supra note 99.
128 See supra text accompanying notes 92-93.
129 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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